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It is a fact that there is ethical criticism about art. Art critics, the general public and 
even artists point out moral flaws in artworks while evaluating them. Philosophers, how-
ever, have maintained a hot debate on the meaning of such criticism. This debate can 
be understood as a disagreement about the kind of relation between the artistic value 
of artworks and their alleged moral value. While some claim that moral value can con-
tribute to artistic value (moralism), others claim that there cannot be such a contribu-
tion (autonomism). Since at least some works of architecture are artworks, that debate 
also concerns architecture. A moderate moralist view claims that some works of archi-
tecture have moral flaws/merits that bear on their artistic evaluation. In an apparently 
promising version, the contention is that some moral flaws/merits are aesthetically rel-
evant. In this paper I argue against such contention and defend an autonomist view. 
Following some taxonomy remarks I distinguish the views in the debate and present 
two points in favour of autonomism: its simplicity and not having the burden of proof. 
Then I discuss Carroll’s merited response argument for moralism and I argue that in its 
best interpretation either it begs the question against autonomism or it is compatible 
with it. I conclude with some possible objections that may help further investigations 
on the subject.
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1. Ethical criticism of art and its philosophical debate*
Ethical criticism of art is the practice of ethical evaluation of artworks. The-
se are often considered good/bad or better/worse in virtue of some mo-
ral properties. For example, a story where the hero is a wicked person is 
considered to be ethically flawed, but the one where the evil character is 
punished is ethically approved. This kind of judgements is widespread and 
assumed to be artistically relevant. And they are not specific to art critics 
since the general public and even artists engage in ethical criticism. And 
even though, like Carroll said, there has been, throughout the twentieth 
century, “a gap between theory and practice with respect to the ethical 
criticism of the arts”,1 it is now safe to say that philosophers are trying to 
bridge this gap. Still, they disagree about how this should be done. This 
disagreement, then, gives rise to the debate on whether and how ethical 
criticism is relevant to artistic evaluation.
I take the philosophical debate on ethical criticism to be essentially 
about answering the question can moral value contribute to the artistic value of 
artworks? In a similar way, Gaut shapes the debate around the question “are 
the ethical flaws (or merits) of works of art also aesthetic flaws (or merits) 
in them?”.2 Although values and properties are two different things, I will 
ignore this difference here for it is commonly assumed in the debate that 
artworks may have moral properties and that these determine a correspon-
ding value. The issue is rather if moral properties or, as in the question 
above, moral value, also help to determine artistic value. This is why I will 
freely move from talk about properties to talk about values and vice versa. 
However, since, in this context, scepticism about values is not even a view 
to take into account, I believe that Gaut’s question depicts the problem in a 
restrictive way. If some ethical property is identical to, or part of, some aes-
thetic property, then surely moral value can contribute to artistic value. But 
this contribution might occur even if there is no identity nor mereological 
relation between the properties. Unless there is some additional argument 
that precludes such contribution, I believe it is better to pursue the more 
general question.
2. Taxonomy remarks
There are two main answers to the question above: (1) moral value can 
* Firstly I thank Maribel and Tomás for organizing this conference. I am also thankful to the audi-
ence for helpful questions and comments on my talk. Lastly, this written version of my talk was 
concluded under the FCT Studentship SFRH/BD/107907/2015 with the financial support from 
POPH and FSE.
1. Carroll 2000, 350.
2. Gaut 2013, 394.
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contribute to artistic value – Moralism; (2) moral value cannot contribute 
to artistic value – Autonomism. These two views are usually divided into 
more specific theses, each one having a radical and a moderate version.3 
Radical moralism states that moral flaws in artworks always count as aesthe-
tic defects in them, while the moderate version only makes the particular 
claim that moral flaws in artworks sometimes count as aesthetic defects 
in them. On the other hand, radical autonomism says that it is nonsense 
to ask if moral value can contribute to the artistic value of artworks, just 
like it is nonsense to ask e.g. what is the square root of a building. It is a 
category mistake. The point of radical autonomism is that moral value and 
aesthetic value are so independent of each other that thinking about their 
interaction is meaningless. As for moderate autonomism, despite accep-
ting the meaningfulness of the question, it insists that the two values are 
independent.
A first taxonomy remark is that that there are good reasons to deny 
that radical autonomism is a relevant view to this debate. Firstly, such a 
view does not seem to have any supporters. As Giovannelli points out, the 
foremost figures of autonomism do not fit under Carroll’s ‘radical’ tag.4 
Following Giovannelli, another, more significant reason to set Carroll’s ra-
dical autonomism aside is that it provides no answer to the question that 
frames the debate.5 Claiming that the question is nonsense is not really an 
answer to it. To be sure, even granting that such claim represents a legiti-
mate logical view, it is not one on a par with all the others that agree with 
the meaningfulness of the question. And the interesting, lively debate is 
about these last views’ different answers to a sound question, not about the 
soundness of the question itself.
A second remark is that I part ways with Giovannelli regarding his 
characterization of autonomism. Even though he dismisses Carroll’s radi-
cal autonomism, he preserves the ‘radical’ predicate to describe the view 
that I simply call ‘autonomism’, that is, the view that accepts (2) above. 
As a consequence, we disagree about the characterization of moderate 
moralism as a view “allowing for the ethical status of artworks to bear, on 
occasion, on their artistic value, but claiming that it always does so in an 
unsystematic way.”6 Under the approach I am favouring, this would be a 
moralist view since it accepts the answer (1). Giovannelli, in contrast, takes 
it as an autonomist view because he believes that the relevant property to 
3. I am following Carroll’s 2000 characterization of the views.
4. See Giovannelli 2007, 118-119.
5. Giovannelli presents his taxonomy under three principles and Carroll’s radical autonomism 
does not satisfy the principle of ethical amenability. This principle says that we ought to look at 
theories that “at least agree on the fact that art can be subject to ethical evaluation” (Giovannelli 
2007, 118).
6. Giovannelli 2007, 122.
distinguish between the basic views is not the acceptance of (1) or (2) but 
whether there is or not a systematic contribution of moral value to the 
artistic value. Instead, I believe that differences in such systematicity only 
allow for distinctions between moralist views. Otherwise we would be using 
the terms ‘radical’ and ‘moderate’ with different meanings in relation to 
autonomism and moralism.7 
The last taxonomy remark is about immoralism, which is the view that 
positive moral value contributes negatively to the artistic value and that 
negative moral value contributes positively to the artistic value. Giovannelli 
dismisses a radical version of immoralism and says that a moderate version 
is “germane to this discussion”.8 However, in my view radical immoralism is 
not irrelevant to this debate. It may be a very unappealing view to defend 
but, contrarily to Carroll’s radical moralism, it provides an answer of the 
sort that is relevant to this debate.
So, to summarize, if we are trying to answer if moral value can con-
tribute to the artistic value of artworks, then there are two basic views, mo-
ralism and autonomism, which offer a positive and a negative answer, res-
pectively. Moreover, moralism can be divided into two more specific views, 
according to the quantity or the generality of the relation between the 
moral and artistic values: the radical view claims that the relation holds 
for all kinds of artworks while the moderate claims that the relation only 
holds for some kinds of artworks. In more detail, moralist views can also be 
distinguished by the quality of the relation between the two values: it can 
be symmetric, where moral merits and moral defects correspond, respec-
tively, to artistic merits and defects; it can be inverse, where moral merits 
and moral defects correspond, respectively, to artistic defects and merits; 
and it can be contextual, where the context will determine whether moral 
merits and moral defects will count positively or negatively to artistic value, 
which means, using the taxonomy just given, that the relation between 
both values is not always symmetric or inverse.9
7. Regarding moralism the terms distinguish the generality of the relation (systematic, in this case) 
between both values, being radical when it concerns all types of artworks and moderate when it 
concerns only some. On the other hand, in the case of autonomism, ‘radical’ and ‘moderate’ are 
not used to distinguish generality since radical autonomism accepts no contribution of moral 
value to the artistic value, be it systematic or not.
8. Giovannelli 2007, 122.
9. See Gaut 2013, 397, where he considers immoralism and contextualism as the same view. In the 
light of the remarks above these are two different views, although they are both forms of moralism. 
See also Baumberger 2015, to whom I owe the “symmetric” and “inverse” jargon. I should also 
mention that I do not claim that this taxonomy is original. Most of it was already present in the 
literature and these remarks are a mere rearranging of the relevant views according to the central 
question from section 1.
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3. Ethical criticism in architecture
Turning our attention to architecture, I believe that the great majority of 
works are buildings with little or nothing to do with art. Most of them 
are homes and workplaces. Some of us are fortunate enough to live or 
work in good buildings, that is, buildings capable of providing shelter and 
comfort beyond the level of basic needs. Also, I think that the really lucky 
ones inhabit artworks or have their daily occupations inside them. Fortune 
aside, the point is that even though not every work of architecture is an 
artwork, some of them are. Now it is certain that trying to offer a detailed 
explanation for this will necessarily involve a conception of art. And it is 
well known that the debate about what is art stands on its own and is much 
more demanding than the ethical criticism debate. Still, is seems rather 
uncontroversial that, say, Frank Lloyd Wright’s Guggenheim Museum or 
Gaudí’s Casa Batlló are artworks. This, then, is enough to extend the deba-
te between moralism and autonomism to architecture.
According to Baumberger we can morally evaluate works of archi-
tecture in two ways: i) through a work’s causal impact on well-being and 
environment during planning, construction and use; ii) and through its 
symbolic meaning or endorsement of moral attitudes.10 It is obvious that, 
e.g., a house can cause quite an impact, and not just on the lives of those 
who inhabit it. All those involved in its construction are also affected. The 
architect, for example, may be happier with a few more digits in his bank 
account or maybe with another entry in his portfolio. And if we suppose 
that health and safety rules were broken, some of the workers would be 
better off if they had declined that particular job. Furthermore, if the ma-
terials used are harsh to the environment, then future generations will be 
affected as well. Accounting these and other less obvious causal impacts of 
architecture will, one assumes, lead to the conclusion that morality is really 
important when it comes to the evaluation of architecture. And, in a broad 
sense, it is. Architecture involves actions and these are morally relevant 
(or some at least are). Nonetheless, the debate about ethical criticism is 
concerned with artistic value and there is no such thing in architecture in 
general. What this means is that by looking at the causal impact of architec-
ture we are taking it as an action in general and not specifically as art. Con-
sequently, we need to focus on the moral assessment of architecture qua 
art. This is why I will ignore the causal impact of a work as a way in which we 
can morally evaluate works of architecture and instead I will concentrate 
on the work’s symbolic meaning.11
10. See Baumberger 2015, 184-185. In my point i) I am merging Baumberger’s first three ways of 
morally evaluating works of architecture.
11. With this agrees Gaut: “Ethical flaws should not be understood in terms of the causal powers 
of works to affect audiences (…) rather, we should understand flaws in terms of the intrinsic 
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3.1. Two points for autonomism
Before I go on to consider and criticize a well known argument for mo-
ralism, I would like to present two points that favour autonomism in this 
debate. The first one is about the burden of proof and second is about 
theoretical simplicity. Although important, these points are not in any way 
decisive and function more as advantages that contribute to an overall 
comparison between the theories.
Starting with the burden of proof, we can say that moralists accept a 
restricted autonomist thesis: that in some cases moral value does not bear 
on artistic value; so, they agree with the autonomist thesis that artistic value 
can be independent of moral value. Therefore, given that the autonomist 
view is a generalization of what both parties accept, and also that moralism 
implies the interaction between the two values, it is moralism that needs 
substantially different support to it. This, then, is why the burden of proof 
is on the moralist.
The moralist might reply that the autonomist view also demands addi-
tional evidence because it implies the universal claim that denies the inte-
raction between moral value and artistic value. And this is right, but the 
relevant difference is that moralism, but not autonomism, needs evidence 
of a kind that goes beyond what is already assumed. That the two values 
sometimes interact, if it is a fact, it is one over and above what both theories 
agree. On the other hand, the autonomist can be pictured as saying that 
what moralists accept in some cases – that the moral and the artistic values 
do not interact – actually apply to every case. Thus, in this sense, the au-
tonomist thesis requires nothing substantially new to the debate. Its initial 
plausibility remains until moralists are able to provide convincing evidence 
for their claim.
The second point that favours autonomism is its relative theoretical 
simplicity. If I am right about the taxonomy remarks from the last section, 
then there is only room for one autonomist view while there are many ways 
of being a moralist. As described above, moralist views differ according to 
the structure of the relation between the two values. Hence, we have sym-
metric, inverse and contextual moralisms. Moralist views can also differ 
about the relative weight given to the two values, that is, about whether 
moral value always worth more, always worth less or, say, if it depends on 
the kind of artwork and/or on the moral properties involved. As one may 
suspect, these issues are tricky to tackle. Additionally, owing to the varie-
ties of moralism, moralists need not only to argue against autonomism, 
but they also need to argue against competing moralist views.12 As such, 
properties of works.” (Gaut 2013, 395) And one of these properties is the artwork’s symbolic 
meaning, which may involve moral attitudes.
12. Jacobson 1997, for example, argues against moderate autonomism from a moralist view (immoralism).
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having a more demanding conceptual apparatus, all those tricky questions 
to address and also various opponents to argue against, moralism lacks 
simplicity when compared to autonomism.
3.2. The merited response argument and replies
I will now discuss Carroll’s version of the merited response argument 
(MRA) for moralism. Here is the argument:
(1) “Securing audience uptake to the responses a work prescribes is a 
leading feature of any artwork’s agenda (...) [and] failing to secu-
re uptake, then, is an aesthetic defect in an artwork”.
(2) Some artworks prescribe emotional moral responses.
(3) “An artwork may fail to secure the emotional responses it mandates 
(...) by being immoral.”
∴ “Sometimes a moral defect in an artwork can be an aesthetic flaw”.13
The intuitive idea of the MRA is that in some cases moral properties 
are aesthetically relevant. Consider, for example, Volkshalle (the people’s 
hall), a work by the Nazi architect Albert Speer that was part of Hitler’s 
project to rebuild Berlin after the war. For obvious reasons this work was 
never built. But from its model and concept we can say that this building 
was conceived to praise the Aryan superiority, represented in the huge, 
non-human proportions of its dome. These aesthetical features of Volkshal-
le, then, are assumed to be connected with racism, which, in turn, somehow, 
blemishes the appreciation of the work.
Returning to the MRA, I think that the conclusion is somewhat mis-
leading because it omits the connection between morality and aesthetics 
which figures in premiss (3). This connection is where the aesthetic rele-
vance of moral properties comes from, namely, their effect on audience 
response. However, the conclusion ignores this and states only that it is 
possible to have an identity between moral properties and aesthetic pro-
perties. Therefore, as presented, the MRA is invalid: one thing is immorali-
ty leading to an aesthetic flaw (through failure to secure audience uptake); 
another is immorality being an aesthetic flaw.
So, in order to maintain the argument’s intuitive idea in a valid form, 
the MRA needs some rephrasing. Here is a more adequate version of the 
argument:
(4) Failing to get the prescribed emotional moral response is an aes-
thetic defect in an artwork.
13. Carroll 2000, 377.
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(5) In some cases, an artwork being immoral explains its failure to get 
the prescribed emotional moral response.
∴ In some cases, an artwork being immoral explains an aesthetic de-
fect in an artwork.
Now that the validity problem is solved, it may look like the autonomist 
must reply by showing that at least one of the premisses is false. I will consi-
der this case but I also think that other, more interesting replies are available 
to the autonomist. A first thing he might say is that the MRA presupposes, in 
(4), that artists’ intentions about the consequences of their work in the au-
dience are relevant to artistic value. This makes moralism incompatible with 
theories of art that deny such a relevance. Although this alone is not enough 
to dismiss (4), it might be considered an unnecessary limitation to place 
on one’s theory of art. In addition, to defend that (4) is false he might ask 
us to consider the following: think of a great architectural work of art; now 
suppose that the author had immoral intentions regarding the work that no 
one knew about; would you say that, after all, you were mistaken about the 
work’s artistic evaluation? If not, does it become a worse work of art after his 
intentions become known? I admit that intuitions can go both ways here, but 
these are questions that the moralist needs to address while the autonomist 
is able to avoid them and offer a parsimonious explanation for the case. He 
can simply say that the author’s intentions are part of his moral character 
and, accordingly, the moral blame is on the author, not on his artwork.
A more damaging reply consists in arguing that the explanation rela-
tion involved in premiss (5) and in the conclusion can have two different 
readings, but that none of them serves the moralist thesis. On the first rea-
ding, the moral property is, by itself, the explanans. If this were so, aesthetic 
properties would play no explanatory role and, as a consequence, the moral 
property would have itself an aesthetic defect or it would be simultaneously 
aesthetic. The problem is that this begs the question since it assumes that 
moralism is true. Maybe moral properties have aesthetic defects, but this 
requires argument just like moralism.14 On the second reading of the expla-
nation relation, the moral property is only a part of the explanans – its role 
consists in causing aesthetic properties. The trouble for the moralist is that 
now the autonomist will be happy to agree that in this way moral properties 
contribute to the artistic value of artworks. Yet, he will insist that such con-
tribution is not qua moral value. Ultimately, aesthetic properties are what is 
relevant to artistic evaluation, not moral value by itself.15
14. The following argument might be used by the moralist: every aesthetic defect contributes 
to the artistic value; some moral properties of artworks have aesthetic defects; ergo, some moral 
properties of artworks contribute to the artistic value. Notice that the autonomist may accept the 
first premiss. But then he cannot accept the second one because it would lead to the conclusion 
that moralism is true.
15. These two readings are not a problem of the explanation relation itself. The problem remains 
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4. Possible objections and conclusion
I will now discuss some possible objections to what I have been defending. 
In doing so I am not trying to bulletproof my view on this debate. This 
would require a much more in depth discussion than the one I am able to 
offer here. In a sense, in this last discussion I suggest some ways that oppo-
nents might explore to enrich the debate. At the same time, considering 
these objections will also be useful to clarify some of the points I made.
One possible objection is that I have dismissed too lightly utility con-
siderations concerning artistic evaluation (in section 3). Someone might 
say that even architecture as art is also about utility and, in this manner, its 
causal impact cannot be ignored in ethical evaluation. Maybe this could 
provide another way to bring ethical and artistic evaluations closer. My wor-
ry with this approach is that by considering a work’s consequences we face 
epistemic difficulties that might lead to scepticism about artistic evalua-
tion. For instance, we would need to discriminate which consequences are 
relevant (all, foreseen, or foreseeable?). This seems hard to achieve, but 
even assuming that such work is done we could still wonder, for any given 
artwork, if some significant consequences were not accounted for. Conse-
quently, we might end up as sceptics about artistic evaluation. In the end 
we would have to choose between pursuing this approach and somehow 
get around its drawbacks or abandon it in favour of a simpler type of eva-
luation, like the aesthetics-based one.
Another objection consists in claiming that it is sufficient for mora-
lists that moral properties cause aesthetic properties. For this to be true, 
my argument at the end of section 3.2 cannot be right and the opponent 
needs to show why. Besides this, he also needs to frame such a reply against 
Carroll’s moderate moralism, since Carroll recently presented his view by 
saying that “sometimes an ethical defect in an artwork can also count as – 
i.e., be identical with – an aesthetic defect.”16 With this I am not assuming 
that Carroll’s authority about how to describe moderate moralism cannot 
be challenged. Rather, this is reminder that there might be good reasons 
to talk about the identity of those properties instead of there being just a 
causal relation between them. If the relevance of this difference is yet to 
be discussed, then this is something that might be explored to bring about 
new and interesting results.
The last objection I will consider has to do with practical implications 
of autonomism. Someone may argue that if architects as artists embrace 
autonomism, they will be careless about the morality of their artworks. 
And, arguably, this is dangerous. But this objection misses the point. It is 
based on a poor understanding of the autonomist thesis as being about 
even when ‘explains’ is replaced by ‘leads to’ or ‘causes’.
16. Carroll 2015, 151-52.
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prescribing actions when, in fact, it is solely about values. Moreover, in 
practice, architecture continues to be subject to moral assessment as an 
action in general. A building can be admirable as an artwork and yet terri-
ble regarding the actions which caused it – it would have been right not to 
build it even at the cost of loosing a fine work of art.
To conclude I will just underline the key points that I have defended. 
I started by presenting what is the ethical criticism of art and its philoso-
phical debate. In accordance with some authors my approach is centred 
on the question can moral value contribute to the artistic value of artworks? The 
varieties of answers to this question led me to present a taxonomy of the 
views on this debate that is slightly different from the ones already availa-
ble.
Then I showed that the debate between moralism and autonomism 
also applies to architecture since at least some works of architecture are 
artworks. Before discussing an argument for moralism I offered two points 
in favour of autonomist: its simplicity and not having the burden of proof. 
These points should be viewed only as advantages that affect an overall 
comparison between the theories. While discussing the merited response 
argument I concluded that, in its original formulation, the argument is 
invalid. In order to give the idea behind the argument some more credit 
I rephrased it into a valid form. Yet, even with this adjustment the autono-
mist has at least two kinds of replies: firstly, he can argue that premiss (4) 
is false; secondly, he can say that there are two readings of the explanation 
relation involved in (4), both of them leading to an unsuccessful argument 
for moralism. The problem with the first reading is that the premiss alrea-
dy assumes moralism to be true. And the problem with the second reading 
is that it is harmless against autonomism.
Finally, I am aware that moralists have other arguments on their 
behalf. I choose to discuss only the MRA because it seems to be a staple 
among moralists and my goal was never to offer a comprehensive refuta-
tion of moralism. Rather, I wanted to present an autonomist view and how 
it fares relatively well against moralism. Even though I am convinced that 
the advantages of autonomism would retain their salience on a thorough 
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